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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Once he has exercised his power of disposition, the life tenant is under
no obligation to account for the proceeds, 2 2 but at his death any of the
proceeds which remain in his possession, whether in the form of money
or other property, will pass to the remainderman.2 3
As a whole these conclusions are satisfactory. By permitting the
life tenant to transfer a fee and yet protecting the remainder by the
regulations attendant upon the disposition of the proceeds, the courts
have succeeded in giving full effect to the apparent intention of the
testator. Furthermore, substantial justice has resulted as the rights of
all interested parties are amply protected.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.
Wills-Requirements for Holographs---Printed Forms.
The testatrix's will, attested by two witnesses, was written by her
own hand in the blanks of a printed will form, a part of which was torn
Reeside v. Annex Building Ass'n, 165 Md. 200, 167 Atl. 72 (1933) ; Selig v. Trost,
110 Miss. 584, 70 So. 699 (1916). If the power of disposition is absolute the life
tenant's mortgage on the fee is valid. Kent v. Morrison, 153 Mass. 137, 26 N. E.
427 (1891) ; Whitfield v. Lyon, 93 Miss. 443, 46 So. 545 (1908) ; Grace v. Perry,
197 Mo. 550, 95 S. W. 875 (1906); Lord v. Roberts, 84 N. H. 517, 153 Atl. 1
(1931) ; Rose City Co. v. Langloe, 141 Ore. 242, 16 P. (2d) 22 (1932) ; see Hamilton v. Hamilton, 141 Iowa 321, 128 N. W. 380 (1910). Hdwever, there is some
conflicting authority. Downie v. Downie, 4 Fed. 55, (C. C. Ind. 1880) ; see Thrall
v. Spear, 63 Vt. 266, 22 Atl. 414 (1891). In Rhode Island a mortgage of the fee
by a life tenant who has a power of disposal is good provided the proceeds are
used to erect improvements on the property. In re Jenks, 21 R. I. 390, 43 AtI.
871 (1899).
'Keniston v. Mayhew, 169 Mass. 612, 47 N. E. 612 (1897) ; Redman v. Barger,
118 Mo. 568, 24 S. W. 177 (1893) ; see Alford v. Alford, 56 Ala. 350 (1876).
Bynum v. Swope, 201 Ala. 19, 75 So. 170 (1917) (the proceeds from the sale
of the property had been invested in other real estate) ; Walker v. Pritchard, 121
Ill. 221, 12 N. E. 336 (1887) (the life tenant still retained some of the money
received as the purchase price of the property); Barton v. Barton, 283 Ill. 388,
119 N. E. 320 (1918) ; In re Beatty's Estate, 172 Iowa 714, 154 N. W. 1028 (1915)
(the proceeds of the sale were traced to a bank deposit) ; Olson v. Weber, 194
Iowa 512, 187 N. W. 465 (1922) (the proceeds from the sale were used to buy
another tract of land which was exchanged for a third) ; In re Eddy's Adm'r, 134
Misc. Rep. 511, 236 N. Y. S. 275 (1929) (the money received from the sale of the
property was traced to certain stocks and bonds) ; see In re McCullough's Estate,
272 Pa. 509, 116 Atl. 477 (1922) ; cf. Davis v. Badlam, 165 Mass. 248, 43 N. E. 91
(1896). Contra: McMurray v. Stanley, 69 Tex. 139, 6 S. W. 412 (1887) ; Feegles
v. Slaughter, 182 S. W. 10 (Tex. Civ. App., 1916).
In some instances the life tenant is only entitled to a share of the proceeds
coexistent with his life estate with the residue immediately becoming the property
of the remainderman. Darden v. Mathews, 173 N. C. 186, 91 S. E. 835 (1917)
see it re Meldrum's Estate, 149 Minn. 342, 183 N. W. 835 (1921).
This problem was raised in a recent North Carolina case, Fletcher v. Bray, 201
N. C. 763, 161 S. E. 383 (1931), in which the life tenant was given the power to
dispose of the growing timber. In holding that the proceeds from the sale of the
timber belonged to the life tenant's heirs rather than the remainderman the court
distinguished the case of Darden v. Mathews, 173 N. C. 186, 91 S. E. 835 (1917)
on the ground that it involved a bare power of sale and not an absolute power
of disposal.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
off, destroying portions of the writing on both sides of the sheet. The
instrument was admitted to probate as a holographic will. Held, the
mere presence of printed words on the sheet will not invalidate the
instrument as a holographic will if the printing is not essential to the
meaning of the handwriting, and the writing itself contains dispositive
words sufficient to make a complete will in itself. In such a case the
printed words are disregarded as being mere surplusage,'
Requirements for the valid execution of holographic wills are prescribed by statutes in the various states, which usually provide that the
will must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator in his
own handwriting. 2 The construction of such wills in which printed
matter appears has been based on two theories :3. (1) whatever the testa4
tdr intended to include as a part of the instrument is a part of the will,
and (2) whatever is not essential to the meaning of the written words
is mere surplusage and is not to be construed with the will.,
Under the intent theory, any printed word which the testator intended to include as a part of the will invalidates it ;6 the mere presence
of printed words on the sheet is immaterial only if they are entirely
dissociated from the will and not intended as a part thereof.7 For instance, a will in which part of the year date was printed was denied
probate even though the instrument had also been dated entirely in the
handwriting of the testator.8 However, in a later case from the same
jurisdiction another will of this nature was held to have been properly
executed where the testator subsequently dated the instrument in his
own handwriting. 9 Various cases have held instruments invalid which
were entirely in the testator's handwriting except for part of 'the figures
in the year date.10
'it re Will of Parsons, 207 N. C. 584, 178 S. E. 78 (1934).
'However, some states do not require that the instrument be dated, and two
states (N. C. and Tenn.) make the additional requirement that the purported will
be found among the valuable papers of deceased to show that some importance is
attached to it as a testamentary disposition. For a compilation of state statutes,
see Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (1928) 14 IowA L. Rav. 1, 25. In North
Carolina the vill must be entirely written, but not necessarily dated, in the handwriting of the testator, with his name inserted in some part thereof, and the handwriting must be proved by three credible witnesses; in addition the document must
be found among the valuable -papers of the deceased, N. C. CODE ANN., (Michie,

1931), §§4131, 4144 (2).
a Mechem,

Integration of Holographic Wills (1934) 12 N. C. L. lREv. 213.
'I, re Thorn's Estate, 183 Cal. 512, 192 Pac. 19 (1920) ; In re Francis' Estate,
191 Cal. 600. 217 Pac. 746 (1923).
'Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21, 113 S. E. 873 (1922).
'Estate of Billings, 64 Cal. 427, 1 Pac. 701 (1884).
In re Oldham's Estate, 203 Cal. 618, 265 Pac. 183 (1928) (the will was written
on a letterhead).
'In re Francis' Estate, 191 Cal. 600, 217 Pac. 746 (1923).
'In re Whitney's Estate, 103 Cal. App. 577, 284 Pac. 1067 (1930).
"oEstate of Billings, 64 Cal. 427, 1 Pac. 701 (1884).
It re Plumel's Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192 (1907) ; In re Francis's Estate,
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The following cases are not clearly within either the intent or surplusage theories :11 In Mississippi, where the whole will was written
except for the caption "My Will" the court said that the printed words
would not affect the validity of a will unless without them the meaning
and purpose were in some may materially affected. 12 In Louisiana a
will containing a printed year date was rejected, since a date was necessary under the statute ;13 but in a subsequent case a will containing two
immaterial words in another's handwriting was admitted to probate on
the ground that the presence or absence of the words would not change
the meaning or alter the provisions made by testator in his own hand14
writing.
Under the surplusage theory, the will will be allowed to stand if the
written portions are sufficient to make a testamentary disposition of the
property without the aid of the printed words. 15 Few cases are clearly
within this theory,16 but in Gooch v. Gooch17 the Virginia court upheld
a will written on a printed form, and allowed it to revive a previously
revoked will, saying that if the written portions of the will are complete and entire in themselves the printed portions may be regarded as
surplusage.
Where the instrument is typewritten, even by the testator himself,
it is not good as a holographic will under either theory.' 8 Typewriting
is essentially a process of printing, and "writing" means a mannerism
in the formation of letters, by which the testator may be identified with
the instrument offered for probate.
The North Carolina statute provides in effect that the will and every
part thereof must be in the testator's own handwriting, 19 and it is said
191 Cal. 600, 217 Pac. 746 (1923) ; Succession of Robertson, 49 La. Ann. 868, 21

So. 586 (1897). But see it re Whitney's Estate, 103 Cal. App. 577, 284 Pac. 1067
(1930); Jones v. Kyle, 168 La. 728, 123 So. 306 (1929).
In these two cases a
date subsequently written in the testator's own handwriting was sufficient even
where the previous date was printed.
The surplusage theory condones any writing sufficient to stand alone as a
testamentary disposition. These cases, while not depending entirely on the testator's intent, do not follow the liberal surplusage theory announced by the North
Carolina court, and the result-something of a cross between the intent and
surplusage doctrines-is based on the holding that printed matter, even where it
is intended to be included in the will by the testator, will invalidate the will only
if it materially affects the meaning of the written words.
' Baker v. Brown, 83 Miss. 793, 36 So. 539 (1904).
" Succession of Robertson, 49 La. Ann. 868, 21 So. 586 (1897). But see Jones
v. Kyle, 168 La. 728, 123 So. 306 (1929) (a subsequent dating in the testator's
handwriting was sufficient even where the previous date was printed).
I Heirs of McMichael v. Bankston, 24 La. Ann. 451 (1872).
'In re Lowrance's Will, 199 N. C. 782, 155 S. E. 876 (1930).
"' See note 11, supra.
27134 Va. 21, 113 S. E. 873 (1922).
'In re Dreyfus' Estate, 175 Cal. 417, 165 Pac. 941 (1917) ; Adams' Executrix
v. Beaumont, 226 Ky. 311, 10 S. W. (2d) 1106 (1928) ; see Langfit v. Langfit,
108 W. Va. 466, 151 S. E. 715 (1930).
"N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§4131, 4144 (2).
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that the provisions of the statute are mandatory, not directory ;2o yet the
court in the instant case has effectively changed the statute to read
((every portion thereof which is in the handwriting of the testator and
testamentary in its nature may be admitted to probate." 21 Other courts
under substantially the same statute, have held purported holographic
wills written on printed forms invalid.2 2 Only the Virginia case,
Gooch v. Gooch,23 sustains the extreme position taken by the North

Carolina court. Considered academically the instant case seems to have
been wrongly decided, but as a matter of practical policy the decision
may be correct on principle if not on the facts. The legislature was
obviously attempting to protect the testator from fraud practiced after
his death, on the theory that handwriting may be sufficiently identified
to connect the testator with anything he himself might write. 24 There
is nothing about the printed form of a will which can be altered to
change the testator's wishes, and he is just as much connected with the
form through his writing in the blanks as in a paper written entirely
by himself, for the dispositive portions of the will are entirely in the
handwriting of the maker of the will. However, the court holds that
the printed portions of a purported will must be disregarded for the
purposes of the statute where the writing is sufficient to stand alone.
It is doubtful if this instrument shows any testamentary intent on its
face without the aid of the printed portions, as the testatrix merely
writes "I give etc.," which is entirely consistent with the idea of a gift
inter vivos, invalid because not completed by delivery during the lifetime
of the donor.2 5 Parol evidence was admitted in the case, not to explain
the language used by the testatrix, and to prove that she intended it to
operate as a posthumous disposition of her property, but to show that
the instrument actually disposed of her property in accordance with the
expressed wishes of the testatrix. In fact, no evidence was disclosed by
the opinion relating directly to this instrument itself, but the court
apparently is influenced by the subsequent declarations of the testatrix
' "The provisions of the statute are, of course, mandatory, and not directory,
and therefore there must be a strict compliance with them, before there can be a
valid execution and probate of a holographic script as a will; but this does not
,mean that the construction of the statute should be so rigid and binding as to
defeat its clearly expressed purpose. It must be construed and enforced strictly,
but at the same time reasonably." In re Jenkins' Will, 157 N. C. 429, 435, 72 S. E.
1072, 1074 (1911) ; In re Will of Low;rance, 199 N. C. 782, 155 S.E. 876 (1930).
"1See Estate of Rand, 61 Cal. 468, 44 Am. Rep. 555 (1882).
'In re Wolcott's Estate, 54 Utah 165, 180 Pac. 169 (1919) ("The fact that
the matter -vritten -by deceased in her own hand, standing alone, might constitute
a complete testamentary disposition of the property, does not alter the case." Such
writing is not what testatrix prepared as her will), Estate of Rand, 61 Cal. 468,
468 Am. Rep. 555 (1882).
'134 Va. 21, 113 S.E. 873 (1922).
' Alexander v. Johnson, 171 N. C. 468, 88 S.E. 785 (1916).
Adams v. Mars, 213 S. W. "622 (Tex. Com. App., 1919).
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in deciding that the language shows a testamentary intent. It might be
considered useless to examine the question of intent when the paper
was written on a will form which clearly shows such intent, but all the
printed portions of the form must be disregarded20 and the testa27
mentary intent must appear on the face of the instrument itself.
The will was attested by two witnesses who did not testify at the
probate proceedings and who apparently did not appear in the case at
all after signing the document. However, that would not affect the
validity of the script as a holograph since the attestation of witnesses is
not regarded as a part of the will. 28 Also, a large portion of the instrument was cut out, whether by the testatrix or by someone else does not
appear, but the question of revocation was not raised.
While the case seems wrong from a technical viewpoint, the court
apparently reaches a desirable result by an extremely liberal application
of the surplusage theory.
MAURICE V. BARNHILL, JR.
Jones v. Kyle, 168 La. 728, 155 S. E. 876 (1930) ; In re Will of Lowrance,
199 N. C. 782, 155 S. E. 876 (1930).
'Wooten v. Hobbs, 170 N. C. 211, 86 S. E. 811 (1915).
'Harrison

v. Burgess, 8 N. C. 384 (1821).

BOOK REVIEW
For My Grandson. Remembrances of an Ancient Victorian. By the Rt.
Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock, Bt., London: John Murray: pp. xx, 233.
10 shillings 6 pence.
Sir Frederick Pollock will be 90 this year. He is a few years
junior to the venerable justice who retired from the Supreme Court of
the United States three years ago,. and who died recently at the age of
94. Now that Holmes is gone, the name of no other living man, perhaps, is so well known in Anglo-American legal history and jurisprudence. The former Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, the
co-author, with Maitland, of the great History of English Law, the
author of two classical treatises, on Torts, and on Contracts (now in
their thirteenth and ninth editions, respectively), and of half-a-dozen
volumes of essays on law and politics, and the first editor of the Law
QuarterlyReview; he needs no introduction. Coming of a distinguished
family of lawyers, he has done faithful homage to "our lady the Common Law," but he has been much more than her knight. He has lived
a life so varied in its interests, he has been so much a part of all that
he has met, that to think of him only as lawyer is to miss the essence
of a rich personality. For this book will prove delightful to all.

